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Summary: 
Since January 2008, the Euro Area has enlarged for the third time to Cyprus and Malta. As Slovakia 
is now planned to join in 2009, these waves of new entries revive the debate around greater 
asymmetries which may threaten the stability of the whole monetary union. 
This paper extends Bayoumi and Eichengreen’s (1992) centre-periphery approach. We show how a 
suitable decomposition of the correlations between supply and demand disturbances enables to get 
two new indices to give a more intuitive assessment of the distance to the Euro area and the origin 
of shock asymmetries. Using monthly data over 1995-2008 on 21 countries, asymmetries are 
measured by correlations among the structural shocks from a VAR process. We then translate these 
correlations estimates into two synthetic indices. One can be interpreted as the relative distance of 
the candidate country to a fully symmetric currency area. The other reveals the relative magnitude 
of shock asymmetries. Our very first results show that most of the countries under study are closer 
to the seminal Euro area rather than to Germany. New comers remain at the periphery of the Euro 
area with pronounced shock asymmetries than either the founder members or the three Opt-Outs. 
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Introduction 
Since January 2008, the Euro Area has enlarged for the third time to Cyprus and Malta. As Slovakia 
is now planned to join in 2009, these waves of new entries revive the debate around greater 
asymmetries which may threaten the stability of the whole monetary union. While little attention 
has been paid to the adhesion of the Drachma, the perspective of a widening to the currencies of the 
Central and Eastern European Countries has revived the debate around the participation in a 
monetary union. Many and fast accessions could jeopardize the stability of the enlarged union as 
well as the definition and the exercise of stabilization policies. It would be the case if the eligible 
countries add to the heterogeneity of the whole system opening the way to new asymmetries or 
reinforcing the existing ones.  
Indeed, it is common now to make the following assessment: if national economies in the Euro area 
diverge considerably, the common monetary policy will not be optimal for all countries concerned. 
A large literature is interested in the asymmetries either of business cycles or shocks of countries in 
the EMU (see Huchet-Bourdon and Pentecôte (2008) for a survey). 
The current financial turmoil has also revived the debate about the instability associated to either 
explicit or implicit Euro targeting as exchange rate policies followed by many EU countries. 
Reconsidering their attitude towards the Euro requires that States must be able to assess their own 
eligibility for a soon entry into the single currency area. The current Euro members may also worry 
about the capacity of the union itself to withstand new entries in the near future. 
Recent works have stressed the predominant role of shock asymmetries in the dynamics and in the 
welfare cost of forming a monetary union (Jondeau and Sahuc, 2007). As also questioned by 
Plasmans and al (2006), the enlargement of a monetary always induces welfare losses when the 
accession country is hit by asymmetric price shocks. Any transfer mechanism is then unable to 
compensate losers for the implied negative spillovers.  
The pessimistic view is reinforced by the fact that EMU insiders would suffer, on average, from 
next enlargements. Further, either full or partial fiscal coalitions jointly with the ECB’s monetary 
policy appear to be instable in the absence of a well-design institutional setting. In this view, our 
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paper extends Bayoumi and Eichengreen’s (1992) core-periphery approach. Their work has been 
widely used to assess empirically the eligibility of a given country to join a currency union. Their 
method relies on the identification of the so-called “structural” supply and demand shocks using 
Vector Auto-Regressive (VAR) models before estimating correlations between common and 
idiosyncratic disturbances or between the dynamic responses of representative aggregates 
(economic activity and prices) to them.  
The aim of this paper is to show how a suitable decomposition of the correlations between supply 
and demand disturbances enables to get two new indices to give a more intuitive assessment of the 
distance to the Euro area and the origin of shock asymmetries: one index in terms of distance of the 
candidate country to a fully symmetric currency area, and the other in terms of the relative 
magnitude of shock asymmetries. 
The paper is organized as follows: The next section provides technical details on the measure of the 
two indexes. Section 2 describes data and presents the results. The final section concludes. 
 
1. Size and side of shock asymmetries: two new indexes  
1.1. Shock correlations and distance from a currency area 
By construction, correlation coefficients between either supply (ρs) or demand shocks (ρd) take their 
values in the [-1,1] interval. Graphically, these correlations lie somewhere in the square box 
delimited by the dashed line as depicted on Figure 1 below.  
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Fig. 1: Vector representation of shock correlations and asymmetries indices 
 
Point S at the upper right corner corresponds to the full symmetric case between any candidate 
member and the reference area or country. At the opposite, the lower left point A reflects complete 
asymmetric shocks, in terms of demand as well as in term of supply. Following Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen’s approach, the closer the candidate country to point S is, the lower is the cost of 
joining the European currency union. From this perspective, it would be interesting to translate 
these correlations into a more intuitive measure of distance to EMU. 
As illustrated on the above Figure 1, this leads us to build two new indices which derive from basic 
trigonometric calculus according to a vector representation in the correlations space of aggregate 
supply and demand disturbances (ρs, ρd). These two complementary indicators indeed receive an 
intuitive appealing when one wishes to gauge the eligibility of a State to a given monetary union. 
The first one can be interpreted as a measure of the relative distance of the candidate country (C1 on 
fig. 1) from the “fully symmetric” case (S). This index derives from the ratio of the norms of two 
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vectors with the “complete asymmetric” case (A) as their common starting point (see figure 1): the 
first one relates (A) to the accession country (C1), while the second one links the “worst” to the 
“best” situations which can be observed in terms of stochastic asymmetries. More precisely, we 
define the distance index ID: 
     
AS
AC
I D
1
1−= .         (1) 
By construction, the distance index ID  varies in the [0,1] range such that the closer to one the index 
is, the more is the candidate country subject to common (symmetric) shocks. In this sense the 
candidate country would be more synchronized with the currency area if ID increases.  
What matters for the moment is only the relative magnitude of asymmetries irrespective of the 
nature of the shocks. To illustrate this point let us consider another accession country whose 
asymmetries are reflected by point C2 such that: 12 Cd
C
s ρρ =  and 12 CsCd ρρ = . 1C  and 2C  are thus 
equidistant to the first “secant” and the vector 21CC  is orthogonal to AS . In this circumstance both 
countries will be characterized by the same “distance” index, namely: 12 CD
C
D II =  since 
12 ACAC = . 
The cost of asymmetries in the wake of an adhesion to a monetary union may differ according to the 
origin of shocks. It is often acknowledged that supply shocks have a permanent effect on output 
whereas demand shocks are assumed to be neutral on real macro-variables in the long run (see 
Fidrmuc and Korhonen, 2006, for a survey).  
But this traditional view has recently been challenged. Given the debate on this issue it is interesting 
to build a second index to reveal the relative intensity of shock asymmetries.  
 
1.2. The side of shock asymmetries 
For this purpose, let us define the angulus ( )1,1 OCOHangC =θ  together with the complex number 
11
1
C
d
C
sC iz ρρ += . We know that: ( )11 arg CC z=θ . It appears from the above figure 1 that the 
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argument of the complex number associated to the vector 1OC  will take the magnitude as well as 
the sign of each correlation coefficient into account. 
Since point S lies on the first “secant”, we can build the asymmetry index IA as: 
      
( )
( )S
C
A
z
z
I
arg
arg
1
=          (2) 
 
Since arg(
1Cz ) varies within the [-pi,pi] range, the discussion involves three cases: 
a) when ] [1,3−∈CAI  the candidate country experiences greater asymmetry from the demand side 
than from the supply side. In this case we verify that either cos(θC) > cos(θS) or 
sin(θC) < sin(θS). This is precisely the case of the accession state (C1) on figure 1: it records 
relatively more asymmetries in terms of demand disturbances (thereby relatively less on the 
supply side): 




<




 →→ OSOC argarg 1 . The same conclusion could be drawn for candidates C6, C7, 
and  C8  which lie in the ]-1,0[, ]-2,-1[, and ]-3,-2[ intervals respectively. Unlike C1, the three 
others exhibit negative correlations between demand shocks. Furthermore, C8 is characterized 
by even stronger supply shock discrepancies. 
b) when ] [ ] [4,13,4 ∪−−∈CAI  supply shocks to the accession country are more asymmetric or less 
synchronized relative to the currency area than demand shocks are. This means that we verify 
either cos(
1Cθ ) < cos(θS) or sin( 1Cθ ) > sin(θS). Such situations are depicted by countries like C2 , 
C3, C4, and C5 on the above graphic: the asymmetry side index takes then its values in the 
corresponding  ] 1,2[, ]2,3[,]3,4[, and ]-4,-3[ range. 
c) when 31 −= orI CA , the correlation between supply shocks is equivalent to its demand 
counterpart. Point C would then lie somewhere along the [AS] segment. 
 
While the candidate States C1 and C2 were found to be equally eligible to the monetary union on the 
basis of the distance index, this is no longer true if we focus now on the extent to which there is 
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asymmetry among shock asymmetries. To decide whether an entry into a currency union is suitable 
or not it also matters having an idea about the induced costs given the nature of shock 
idiosyncrasies. One may furthermore wonder about the weights to be assigned to each of these 
sources of costs in some representative social loss function. Unfortunately, little is known about 
how to link these stochastic asymmetries to the cost of adhesion to a currency area (see although 
Hughes-Hallett and Jensen (2004) for a tentative assessment). 
As shown on figure 1, the two new indices based on shock correlations can be used to identify 
countries belonging to the core or to the periphery of a given currency area (which is referred to 
here by point S). However, as pointed out by Artis (2003), there is no well-established theoretical 
foundation about the related trigger distance levels in terms of stochastic asymmetries. Assuming 
equal weights of the welfare effects induced by a lack of synchronization of macroeconomic shocks 
on either the demand or the supply side would lead to the depicted circular zoning. It depends on 
distance which separates the candidate country Ci to the perfect symmetric monetary union (S). 
Instead, unequal weights would produce rather different (elliptic) zones.  
To sum up the above discussion, table 1 below shows how the correlations of structural shocks vary 
with the values taken by our distance and asymmetric indices. 
 8 
Table 1: Shock correlations and the distance/asymmetry indices 
Distance Index IA 
 
[0 , 0.5] [0.5 , 1] 
]-4 , -3[ 
Very strong to moderate asymmetries, 
Supply-dominated asymmetries 
0,0 << Cs
C
d ρρ and CsCd ρρ <  
 
-3 
Very strong to moderate asymmetries 
0,0 << Cs
C
d ρρ and CsCd ρρ =  
 
]-3 , 2[ 
Very strong to moderate asymmetries 
Demand-dominated asymmetries 
0,0 << Cs
C
d ρρ and CsCd ρρ >  
 
[-2 , 0[ 
Moderate to low asymmetries  
Demand-dominated asymmetries 
0,0 ≥< Cs
C
d ρρ and CsCd ρρ <  
 
]0 , 1[  
Moderate to low asymmetries  
Demand-dominated asymmetries 
0,0 >> Cs
C
d ρρ and CsCd ρρ <  
1  
Moderate to low asymmetries  
0,0 ≥≥ Cs
C
d ρρ and CsCd ρρ =  
]1 , 2]  
Moderate to low asymmetries  
Supply-dominated asymmetries 
0,0 ≥> Cs
C
d ρρ and CsCd ρρ >  
A
sy
m
m
et
ry
 
In
de
x
 
I D
 
]2 , 4]  
Very strong to moderate asymmetries 
Supply-dominated asymmetries 
0,0 <≥ Cs
C
d ρρ and CsCd ρρ >  
 
 9 
2. Results 
2.1. Data 
The data include price and output time series. As a proxy for output we consider the industrial 
production index in volume. Both the consumer price index (CPI) and the harmonised CPI are also 
used according to the countries. Data are taken from the Eurostat database on a monthly basis over 
the period 1995:01-2008:04. Twenty-one countries are included in the sample: the eleven founders, 
countries which joined the EMU after 1999 (Greece in 2001, Slovenia in 2007, Cyprus in 20081), 
the “Outs” (United Kingdom, Sweden and Denmark), future EU countries candidates to the EMU 
(Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Slovakia). 
A related issue is how to specify the reference area: several studies discuss this point (see Huchet-
Bourdon and Pentecôte (2008) for a survey). We can indeed take one country as reference; in this 
case, the choice often bears on Germany. But we can also make our comparisons with the Euro area 
as a whole. This raises further questions since the Euro did not exist before 1999, and also because 
the number of countries participating to the EMU has grown over/through time. This requires a 
weighted average of several European economies. Both cases are first adopted (German and EMU-
11) but in a second step only the aggregated series are kept2. 
We also need aggregated series corresponding to the EMU with 11 countries. Which aggregated 
data can we consider for the Euro area still remains a great question.  
The answer is not obvious for several reasons. First, we need long historical data series but the Euro 
area did not exist before 1999. We have consequently to build the aggregated series with the 
national data for the period pre-1999 at least. Second, the Euro area has been enlarged several times 
so which countries do we consider in the aggregated series. Do we consider aggregated series 
corresponding to 11, 12, 13 and 15 countries between 1999 and 2008? Third we have to determine 
                                                 
1
 Malta is not included in our sample due to the unavailability of monthly data on the studied period. 
2
 Mink, Jacobs and De Haan (2007) select the cycle that lies the closest to all individual countries’ cycles in the region 
in terms of synchronicity and co-movement. 
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the weights of the different countries of the Euro area. The common approach is to aggregate across 
these countries using a constant pre-specified set of weights3.  
In this study Eurostat data are used for the following reasons. First, Eurostat data are available over 
our sample: from 1995 to 2008. Second, it takes the various enlargements into account. Third, HCPI 
series are built by Eurostat. Fourth, we need to make these aggregations for two series, industrial 
production and prices. 
Average data for the EMU-11 about IPI, CPI and HCPI are collected from Eurostat Database. The 
HCPI series for the EMU with 11 countries is only available until 2000 (before the first 
enlargement). Hence, we rebuilt the series by initially transforming by retropolation Euro-12 in 
Euro-11 over the period before 2001, and then by extrapolating the principle of calculation of the 
weights to supplement EMU-11 after 2001. 
 
2.2. Estimated results 
The first step has been to estimate structural VARs in order to measure correlations among the 
structural shocks. These estimations are not reported here for mainly two reasons. Firstly, this is not 
the main object of this paper4, and secondly because of the size of the sample (21 countries, and two 
kinds of shocks, supply and demand). 
On the other hand these estimations enable to then compute two synthetic indices. One corresponds 
to the relative distance of the candidate country to a fully currency area, and the other measures the 
relative magnitude of shock asymmetries. Both indices are computed for each country of the sample 
at each date between 1995 and 2008. 
To ease the interpretation of so many results, we looked for judicious graphic representations.  
We first represent each index over the period 1998-2008 for each country relative to Germany and 
the Euro area with the 11 founder countries. Graphs are represented in Annex. Our first objective 
here is to see whether the choice of the reference zone is important when we make our comparisons. 
                                                 
3
 Anderson, Dungey, and Osborn (2007) discuss the various approaches that have been used for constructing Euro area 
data. 
4
 See Huchet-Bourdon and Pentecôte (2008) for details on correlations asymmetries. 
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According to the figures, it seems that the shape of the evolution of both indices is not so many 
different if computations are made either with Germany as the reference zone or with the EMU-11. 
Nevertheless, this first look do not must occult the fact that there are substantially differences in the 
size of the relative strength of asymmetries: the value is generally higher and positive if we are 
interested in comparisons with the EMU-11 whereas it is rather negative when we take Germany as 
the reference zone. 
However, the figures show how it is difficult to study the impacts of such measures for all countries 
and on the whole period. 
 
So, in a second step, we represent on the same graph both indices, measured either compared to 
Germany or to the Euro area with 11 countries, for three key dates: 1998:5 which corresponds to the 
announcement of the eleven founders countries of the EMU, 2004:5 because of the huge 
enlargement of the EU, and 2008:4 that is the last available data whatever the country.  
A black triangle symbolises the measures relative to the EMU-11, and a grey one means that 
Germany is the target country for computations. 
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Figure 2: Countries’ eligibility to EMU from size and side of shock asymmetry         
( comparisons with Euro-11,  with Germany) 
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Classification, 2008:4
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Note : AT: Austria, BE: Belgium, CY : Cyprus, DK: Denmark, DE: Germany, ET: Estonia, FI: Finland, FR: France, 
GR: Greece, IR: Ireland, IT: Italy, LT: Lithuania, LU: Luxembourg, LV: Latvia, NL: Netherlands, PT: Portugal, 
SK: Slovakia, SP: Spain, SV: Slovenia, SW: Sweden, UK: United Kingdom. 
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When comparisons are made with the aggregated EMU with 11 countries, figure 2 reveals that both 
indices are higher than those corresponding to the comparisons with Germany, whatever the chosen 
date. Besides, both indices reflect a decrease in the asymmetries through the period under study. 
The last part of the graph shows that new comers (now in the EMU or still applicant countries) like 
Cyprus, Greece, Slovakia, and Latvia, remain at the periphery of the Euro area with more 
pronounced shock asymmetries than either the founder members or the three “Opt-Outs”. 
 
Third, it should be very interesting to investigate more precisely our results according to the origin 
of the asymmetries (supply or demand side) as well as the level of distance of the country to the 
Euro area (either the band is changing or the values are those of May 1998). We make this exercise 
for two reference zones again: Germany or EMU-11. 
 
Table 2a: Asymmetries and distance (Euro-11 as the reference zone)
AT  BE  GR  IT   LT  NL  PT  SW  SV  UK 
AT   BE  SP  LU  SW  UK      
FR                
FR  IT  
] 1  ,  2  ]
Asymmetries 
mainly from the 
Demand side 
[ 0  ,  1 [ SV                       DK  SV  ET  LT  LV  NL  PT  
DK                       
-
SP  ET  IR  LU              
CY  GR  SK
DE  FI                             
DE  FI   IR      
Asymmetries 
mainly from the 
Supply side 
Distance to the Euro Area (time-varying u l  and u u )
Far                       
[ 0  ,  d l  [
Medium                            
[ d l   ,  d u  [
Close             
[ du   ,  1 ]
Asymmetries 
mainly from the 
Demand side 
] -2  ,  0 ]
 
Note : First row (red): May 1998; Second row (blue): April 2008 
 
Table 2b: Asymmetries and distance (Euro-11 as the reference zone)
Asymmetries 
mainly from the 
Demand side 
Distance to the Euro Area (u l  and u u  in May 1998)
Far                       
[ 0  ,  0.547 [
Medium                            
[ 0.547  ,  0.728 [
Close             
[ 0.728  ,  1 ]
Asymmetries 
mainly from the 
Demand side 
[ 0  ,  1 [ SV                       ET  LV  
AT  BE  GR  IT   LT  NL  PT  SW  SV  UK 
DK  LT   LU  NL  PT  SW  SV  UK      
FR                
AT  BE  SP  FR  IT  
] -2  ,  0 ] SP  ET  IR  LU              CY  SK
DE  DK  FI                          
GR      
-                  
DE  FI  IR
] 1  ,  2  ] DK                       
-
Asymmetries 
mainly from the 
Supply side 
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The country classification according to their distance (by columns) and their relative asymmetry (by 
rows) indices is reported on tables 2a and 2b. Columns refer to the distance to each country from 
the Euro area given the lower (dl) and upper (du) distance bounds, computed as the sample mean 
minus or plus one standard deviation. We adopt two approaches: limits fluctuate with the current 
distribution of the distance indices in table 2a, while these bounds are kept fixed at their 1998 levels 
in table 2b. The latter case enables to show how the classification between countries would have 
changed if the initial distribution of distances was maintained.  
By construction, the trigger values for the relative asymmetry index remain the same. From our 
results, asymmetries are always in the [-2,2] range. This implies that the estimated correlations of 
supply shocks are always positive (or nil), while those on demand side may change sign. 
Major differences from table 2a to table 2b are stressed in italic case because they correspond to a 
switch of one country from one group to another. A striking feature is the general movement of the 
founder members to get closer to the Euro area through time. If we had maintained the distance 
bounds of 1998, six other economies (Austria, Belgium, Spain, Germany, Finland and Ireland), 
belong now to what can be defined as the core, in addition to France and (more recently) Italy. The 
remaining three founders have moved towards the core but still lie at the (first) periphery: Portugal 
and, more surprisingly, the Luxemburg and the Netherlands. Since the latter were often viewed as 
members of the former D-Mark currency union, this may signal that Germany is no longer the sole 
centre of gravity of the EMU. 
 
Conclusion 
Using monthly data over 1995-2008 on 21 countries, asymmetries are measured by correlations 
among the structural shocks from a VAR process. We then translate these correlations estimates 
into two synthetic indices. One can be interpreted as the relative distance of the candidate country to 
a fully symmetric currency area. The other reveals the relative magnitude of shock asymmetries. 
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These indices enable to know on which side are dominated shock asymmetries given the country’s 
distance to the Euro area. 
Our very first results show that most of the countries under study are closer to the seminal Euro area 
rather than to Germany. New comers remain at the periphery of the Euro area with pronounced 
shock asymmetries than either the founder members or the three Opt-Outs. Our results demonstrate 
also a general movement of the founder members to get closer to the Euro area through time. 
Finally, we find that three founders have moved towards the core but still lie at the (first) periphery: 
Portugal and, more surprisingly, the Luxemburg and the Netherlands. Since the latter were often 
viewed as members of the former D-Mark currency union, this may signal that Germany is no 
longer the sole centre of gravity of the EMU. 
We have to complete this work by looking for the link between the asymmetries and the cost of 
adhesion to a currency area: the idea is to consider a loss function (see Hughes-Hallett and Jensen 
(2004)). It would enable us to answer to the following questions: What does imply the enlargement 
process on the cost of (next) entry and on the cost of membership for its current members? What is 
the overall cost of the growing EMU? Is there a boundary to enlargement? 
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Annex 
Denmark / Enlarged Euro area:  Distance from full symmetry
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1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.64
0.80
0.96
1.12
1.28
1.44
  
Denmark / Euro area-11:  Distance from full symmetry
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.50
0.52
0.54
0.56
0.58
0.60
0.62
0.64
0.66
0.68
DenEuro area-11mark / :  Relativ e strength of asymmetries
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.64
0.80
0.96
1.12
1.28
1.44
 
Sweden / Enlarged Euro area: Distance from full symmetry
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.575
0.600
0.625
0.650
0.675
0.700
Sweden / Enlarged Euro area: Relativ e strength of asymmetries
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
  
Sweden / Euro area-11:  Distance from full symmetry
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.576
0.592
0.608
0.624
0.640
0.656
0.672
0.688
Sweden / Euro area-11:  Relativ e strength of asymmetries
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
 
United Kingdom / Enlarged Euro area:  Distance from full symmetry
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.64
0.66
0.68
0.70
0.72
0.74
United Kingdom / Enlarged Euro area:  Relativ e strength of asymmetries
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
  
United Kingdom / Euro area-11:  Distance from full symmetry
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.64
0.65
0.66
0.67
0.68
0.69
0.70
0.71
0.72
0.73
United Kingdom / Euro area-11:  Relativ e strength of asymmetries
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
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Austria / Enlarged Euro area:  Distance from full symmetry
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.625
0.650
0.675
0.700
0.725
0.750
0.775
Austria / Enlarged Euro area:  Relativ e strength of asymmetries
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.55
0.60
  
Austria / Euro Area-11:  Distance from full symmetry
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.625
0.650
0.675
0.700
0.725
0.750
0.775
Austria / Euro Area-11:  Relativ e strength of asymmetries
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.55
0.60
 
Belgium / Enlarged Euro area:  Distance from full symmetry
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.650
0.675
0.700
0.725
0.750
0.775
0.800
0.825
0.850
Belgium / Enlarged Euro area:  Relativ e strength of asymmetries
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.468
0.486
0.504
0.522
0.540
0.558
0.576
0.594
0.612
  
Belgium / Euro area-11: Distance from full symmetry
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.650
0.675
0.700
0.725
0.750
0.775
0.800
0.825
BelEuro area-11gium / : Relativ e strength of asymmetries
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.46
0.48
0.50
0.52
0.54
0.56
0.58
0.60
0.62
 
Luxemburg / Enlarged Euro area: Distance from full symmetry
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.45
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
Luxemburg / Enlarged Euro area: Relativ e strength of asymmetries
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
-1.0
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
-0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
  
Luxemburg / Euro area-11:  Distance from full symmetry
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.44
0.48
0.52
0.56
0.60
0.64
0.68
0.72
Luxemburg / Euro area-11:  Relativ e strength of asymmetries
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
-1.0
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
-0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
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Germany / Euro area-11:  Distance from full symmetry
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.675
0.700
0.725
0.750
0.775
0.800
0.825
Germany / Euro area-11:  Relativ e strength of asymmetries
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.250
0.275
0.300
0.325
0.350
0.375
0.400
0.425
0.450
 
The Netherlands / Enlarged Euro area: Distance from full symmetry
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.550
0.575
0.600
0.625
0.650
0.675
The Netherlands / Enlarged Euro area: Relativ e strength of asymmetries
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
  
The Netherlands / Euro area-11:  Distance from full symmetry
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.560
0.576
0.592
0.608
0.624
0.640
0.656
0.672
The Netherlands / Euro area-11:  Relativ e strength of asymmetries
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.16
0.24
0.32
0.40
0.48
0.56
0.64
 
Finland / Enlarged Euro area:  Distance from full symmetry
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.66
0.68
0.70
0.72
0.74
0.76
0.78
Finland / Enlarged Euro area:  Relativ e strength of asymmetries
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.14
0.21
0.28
0.35
0.42
0.49
0.56
0.63
  
Finland / Euro area-11:  Distance from full symmetry
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.66
0.68
0.70
0.72
0.74
0.76
0.78
Finland / Euro area-11:  Relativ e strength of asymmetries
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
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Greece / Enlarged Euro area:  Distance from perfect symmetry
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.52
0.54
0.56
0.58
0.60
0.62
0.64
0.66
Greece / Enlarged Euro area:  Relativ e strength of asymmetries
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
  
Greece / Euro area-11:  Distance from perfect symmetry
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.52
0.54
0.56
0.58
0.60
0.62
0.64
GrEuro area-11eece / :  Relativ e strength of asymmetries
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
 
Slov enia / Enlarged Euro area:  Distance from perfect symmetry
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.500
0.525
0.550
0.575
0.600
Slov enia / Enlarged Euro area:  Relativ e strength of asymmetries
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.72
0.80
0.88
0.96
1.04
1.12
1.20
1.28
1.36
  
Slov enia / Euro area-11:  Distance from perfect symmetry
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.496
0.512
0.528
0.544
0.560
0.576
0.592
0.608
Slov enia / Euro area-11:  Relativ e strength of asymmetries
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.72
0.80
0.88
0.96
1.04
1.12
1.20
1.28
1.36
 
Slov akia / Enlarged Euro area:  Distance from full symmetry
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.48
0.50
0.52
0.54
0.56
0.58
Slov akia / Enlarged Euro area:  Relativ e strength of asymmetries
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
-0.64
-0.56
-0.48
-0.40
-0.32
-0.24
-0.16
-0.08
0.00
0.08
  
Slov akia / Euro area-11:  Distance from full symmetry
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.48
0.50
0.52
0.54
0.56
0.58
Slov akia / Euro area-11:  Relativ e strength of asymmetries
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
-0.64
-0.56
-0.48
-0.40
-0.32
-0.24
-0.16
-0.08
0.00
0.08
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Cyprus / Enlarged Euro area:  Distance from full symmetry
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.544
0.560
0.576
0.592
0.608
0.624
0.640
0.656
Cyprus / Enlarged Euro area:  Relativ e strength of asymmetries
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.90
0.95
1.00
1.05
1.10
1.15
1.20
1.25
  
Cyprus / Euro area-11: Distance from full symmetry
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.39
0.40
0.41
0.42
0.43
0.44
0.45
0.46
0.47
Cyprus / Euro area-11: Relativ e strength of asymmetries
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
-1.55
-1.50
-1.45
-1.40
-1.35
-1.30
-1.25
-1.20
-1.15
 
France / Enlarged Euro area:  Distance from full symmetry
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.77
0.78
0.79
0.80
0.81
0.82
0.83
0.84
0.85
0.86
France / Enlarged Euro area:  Relativ e strength of asymmetries
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.496
0.512
0.528
0.544
0.560
0.576
0.592
0.608
  
France / Euro area-11: Distance from full symmetry
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.77
0.78
0.79
0.80
0.81
0.82
0.83
0.84
0.85
0.86
France / Euro area-11: Relativ e strength of asymmetries
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.48
0.50
0.52
0.54
0.56
0.58
0.60
 
Italy / Enlarged Euro area: Distance from full symmetry
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.66
0.68
0.70
0.72
0.74
0.76
0.78
0.80
0.82
0.84
Italy / Enlarged Euro area: Relativ e strength of asymmetries
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.55
  
Italy / Euro area-11:  Distance from full symmetry
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.66
0.68
0.70
0.72
0.74
0.76
0.78
0.80
0.82
0.84
Italy / Euro area-11:  Relativ e strength of asymmetries
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.55
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Ireland / Enlarged Euro area:  Distance from full symmetry
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
Ireland / Enlarged Euro area:  Relativ e strength of asymmetries
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
  
Ireland / Euro area-11: Distance from full symmetry
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
Ireland / Euro area-11: Relativ e strength of asymmetries
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
 
Portugal / Enlarged Euro area:  Distance from full symmetry
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.575
0.600
0.625
0.650
0.675
0.700
Portugal / Enlarged Euro area:  Relativ e strength of asymmetries
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
  
Portugal / Euro area-11:  Distance from full symmetry
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.575
0.600
0.625
0.650
0.675
0.700
Portugal / Euro area-11:  Relativ e strength of asymmetries
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
 
Spain / Enlarged Euro area:  Distance from full symmetry
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.56
0.60
0.64
0.68
0.72
0.76
0.80
0.84
Spain / Enlarged Euro area:  Relativ e strength of asymmetries
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
  
Spain / Euro area-11: Distance from full symmetry
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.56
0.60
0.64
0.68
0.72
0.76
0.80
0.84
Spain / Euro area-11: Relativ e strength of asymmetries
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
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Estonia / Enlarged Euro area:  Distance from full symmetry
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.46
0.47
0.48
0.49
0.50
0.51
0.52
0.53
0.54
0.55
Estonia / Enlarged Euro area:  Relativ e strength of asymmetries
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
-1.05
-0.70
-0.35
0.00
0.35
0.70
1.05
1.40
1.75
  
Estonia / Euro area-11:  Distance from full symmetry
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.46
0.47
0.48
0.49
0.50
0.51
0.52
0.53
0.54
0.55
Estonia / Euro area-11:  Relativ e strength of asymmetries
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
-1.05
-0.70
-0.35
0.00
0.35
0.70
1.05
1.40
1.75
 
Lithuania / Enlarged Euro area:  Distance from full symmetry
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.492
0.504
0.516
0.528
0.540
0.552
0.564
0.576
0.588
0.600
Lithuania / Enlarged Euro area:  Relativ e strength of asymmetries
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
-0.75
-0.50
-0.25
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
  
Lithuania / Euro area-11:  Distance from full symmetry
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.492
0.504
0.516
0.528
0.540
0.552
0.564
0.576
0.588
0.600
LithuEuro area-11ania / :  Relativ e strength of asymmetries
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
-0.75
-0.50
-0.25
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
 
Latv ia / Enlarged Euro area: Distance from full symmetry
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
0.48
0.49
0.50
0.51
0.52
0.53
0.54
0.55
Latv ia / Enlarged Euro area: Relativ e strength of asymmetries
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
1.25
1.50
1.75
  
Latv ia / Euro area-11: Distance from full symmetry
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
0.48
0.49
0.50
0.51
0.52
0.53
0.54
0.55
0.56
Latv ia / Euro area-11: Relativ e strength of asymmetries
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
-0.50
-0.25
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
1.25
1.50
1.75
   
 
 
